'The Role Of Intelligence In The Battle Of Britain'
An excerpt that illustrates how wrong the Nazis were about the RAF
Military Intelligence played a crucial role in determining the war's outcome. It is only something of a generalisation to say that in Nazi Germany, a disparate group of agencies, often working in isolation, not integrating different sources of information, anxious to please their political masters by providing the ‘right’ information, failed to give the Wehrmacht the ‘usable’ intelligence it needed. Whereas in Britain, and later amongst the Allies, some stunning developments in technologies such as radar and decryption, alongside some judicious systems for managing ‘the product’ and protecting the secrecy of its origins, gave them an enormous advantage.
This is the picture that emerges from a study of just a small part of the conflict - The Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Britain. This contrasts the different approaches taken by Germany and Britain. Aspects of the story relating to RAF Fighter Command will be familiar to many. But the story of the Nazi approach is much less well known. This is not just a technical story, but also how the various personalities, such as the peculiar Hermann Goering, chose to use it or on occasions, ignore it, or even destroy it.
The following excerpt is a discussion of the Luftwaffe report ‘Comparative Study of RAF and Luftwaffe Striking Power’ issued on 16 July 1940:
RAF fighters, Schmid’s report claimed, were inferior to the German Bf 109, and even the Bf 110 was normally considered to be a match for the Spitfire, but it was grudgingly admitted that the very best British pilots might give it a hard time. Fighter Command was said to have an adequate supply of trained pilots but, especially after Dunkirk, was struggling to maintain its aircraft numbers.
Schmid’s report failed, almost completely, to understand the sophisticated and integrated Dowding System of fighter control, believing instead that Fighter Command squadrons operated essentially as individual units controlled entirely from their home base independently of other squadrons in the same area but operating from a different airfield.
The following are extracts from Schmid’s paper:
... there are about 900 first-line fighters (ca. 550 Hurricanes and 350 Spitfires) of which only 75% are serviceable at any one time. They are not equipped with cannon and should be considered inferior to the Bf 109.
... there are about 1,150 first-line bombers of which the Hampden (ca.400) is considered to be the best. There are also a large number of Blenheims but these are not considered to be first-line aircraft. All bombers have poor armour and bomb aiming devices, but are generally well armed.
... fighter crews are generally well trained but bomber crews are mostly inexperienced and inefficient.
... the RAF is entirely dependent on home production of aircraft (200-300 fighters and 140 bombers every month).This level of production is likely to decrease in light of maritime blockade of essential raw materials. Any intensification of the air war will further reduce production. Any aircraft supplied by the US are not expected to make a contribution before 1941.
... there are substantial stocks of fuel.
... the Luftwaffe is clearly superior to the RAF as regards strength, equipment, training, command and location of bases.
... production of bombs is adequate for several weeks of operations.
... the number of heavy and light anti-aircraft guns available is by no means adequate to ensure protection of the whole island ground defences, but there is a large number of searchlights.
… there are many airstrips throughout the country but only a few can be considered to be operational with modern facilities and supply installations. There is little strategic flexibility in operations.
… the command at high level is inflexible in its organisation and strategy. As formations are rigidly attached to their home bases, command at medium levels suffers mainly from operations being controlled by officers no longer accustomed to flying. Command at low levels lacks tactical skill.
... bomber formations, even with fighter escort, are not capable of carrying out effective daylight attacks regularly, particularly as escort operations are in any case limited by the lack of long-range single-engine or heavy fighters. The RAF will therefore be obliged to limit its activity to night operations even in the event of intensified air warfare. These operations will undoubtedly achieve a nuisance value but will in no way be decisive. In contrast, the Luftwaffe is in a position to go over to decisive daylight operations owing to the inadequate air defences of the island.
... the Luftwaffe is clearly superior to the RAF as regards strength, equipment, training, command and location of bases. In the event of an intensification of the air war the Luftwaffe, unlike the RAF, will be in a position in every respect to achieve a decisive effect this year if the time for the start of large-scale operations is set early enough to allow advantages to be taken of the months with relatively favourable weather conditions.
Since so much reliance was placed upon this report by the Luftwaffe High Command, it is worth noting in detail the flaws in Schmid’s assessment, which were many:
• The inferiority of British fighters to the Bf 109 was exaggerated; in reality the differences were small in terms of performance but certainly the Bf 109’s cannon were significant. The Bf 110 proved to be highly vulnerable when employed as an escort fighter. Its main tactic was the formation of a defensive circle, ‘Abwehrkreis’ , which was very effective in certain situations but when exposed in single combat, the Bf 110 was quite unable to compete with the more manoeuvrable British fighters.
• The number of British anti-aircraft guns was slightly underestimated.
• Emphasis was placed on aircraft production but Dowding’s real problem was in the inadequate number of qualified pilots coming through the flying schools. After its losses in the Battle of France, Fighter Command was beginning to suffer from a serious shortage of experienced, combat-hardened pilots. Aircraft production was never a problem during the Battle of Britain with more than 450 machines coming off the production lines each month. This confounded Luftwaffe analysts whose estimates of British strength were based on ‘victories’ from the combat reports and Schmid’s low production figure.
• The analysis of British command and control was completely wrong. Schmid believed that each squadron was inflexibly tied to a particular base, but actually squadrons could move from one base to another at a moment’s notice. The assessment of commanders who had lost touch with the realities of flying and combat was graphically contradicted by those, like Sir Keith Park, AOC 11 Group, who flew regularly - sometimes even in combat. This was in sharp contrast to many in the Luftwaffe middle-ranks who could not fly at all.
• Little note was taken of the repair and maintenance facilities available to squadrons especially as damaged aircraft would be landed on home ground, whereas damaged Luftwaffe aircraft had to land in enemy territory or face a long haul back across the Channel during which they would be at the mercy of pursuers.
Perhaps the most egregious error of all was that there was no mention of the British radar operations and radio communications network. The report’s assessment of Luftwaffe capabilities, which Schmid was not particularly commissioned to make, by contrast, glossed over its obvious shortcomings in a way that ensured he did not disturb the mood of elation and superiority engendered in its ranks by recent successes. The limitations of this report were exacerbated by the fragmentation, rivalry and petty jealousy rampant within the German Intelligence Services.
The report reiterated his assessment made months earlier:
From Germany’s point of view Britain is the most dangerous of all possible enemies. The war cannot be ended in a way favourable to us as long as Britain has not been mastered. Germany’s war aim must therefore be to strike at Britain with all available weapons.
Schmid had quickly recognised the new mood in Berlin and responded in a way that he thought was most advantageous for himself. The tone he adopted in his June report was totally at odds with the conclusions of Studie Blau [made in 1939] and seems to have been clearly influenced by the stunning victories in France.
© Norman Ridley 2021, 'The Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Britain'. Reproduced courtesy of Pen & Sword Publishers Ltd.
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